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Abstract
A regulator imposing “sales restrictions” on firms competing in oligopolistic mar-
kets may enhance quality provision by the firms. Moreover, for most restrictions levels,
the impact on quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition.
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1. Introduction
Ensuring quality provision by monopolies or regulated utilities has always been a concern
for public authorities. This problem becomes even more critical in the context of massive
deregulations such as the one we are currently facing in Europe and the United States.
Recent examples of quality failure in airlines industries, railways or electricity provision
have lead policy makers to believe that competition could be incompatible with quality
provision for the presence of strong asymmetries of information. Our aim in this note
is to provide comfort to regulators by showing that a simple monitoring tool like a sales
restriction can motivate firms to provide high levels of quality.
For this task we use a standard model of Industrial Organization: firms commit to
quality levels in a first stage and then compete on the consumer market. This modelling
choice is motivated by the long-term nature of quality decisions (sunk cost) relative to
price or quantity decisions. In this context, there are two basic reasons explaining why
the provision of high quality may not be optimal for firms under oligopoly competition.
First, quality may be costly to produce. Therefore, a firm may wish to select a relatively
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low quality level for its product, even if this leads to less sales at low prices, simply because
it saves on costs. Second, even if producing quality entails no cost, a low quality profile
might be optimal because it relaxes competition.
Suppose then that a public authority wishes to alter optimal quality selection by the
firms. It may either intervene at the quality selection stage, or at the market competition
stage (or both). Public intervention at the market stage, through taxes or subsidies, has
been studied very early. This kind of intervention raises a classic issue: the impact of a
specific intervention is heavily dependent on the mode of competition at the market stage.
Depending on whether firms compete a` la Cournot or a` la Bertrand, a given policy may
have opposite effect on quality selection. The relevant question at this step is therefore:
does the government have enough information regarding the mode of competition?
In case of doubts the public authority may prefer to interfere directly at the quality
selection stage. A typical intervention at this stage is to alter the strategy space of the
firms. Removing low quality levels is typically achieved by imposing Minimum Quality
Standards. However, MQS have their own drawbacks. They only constrain firms’ choices
while leaving untouched their incentives to select low quality levels. Therefore, a MQS re-
quires a close monitoring by the regulator. And again, this raises non trivial informational
issues.
In this note, we consider an alternative mechanism aimed at ensuring quality provision:
the imposition of “sales restrictions” on the firms active in the market. This mode of
regulation works at the market stage and as we show hereafter, its impact on quality
selection is largely independent of the mode of competition. Therefore, it is immune
against the standard criticism applying to market intervention in oligopolistic industries.
Moreover, the key virtue of this mechanism is that is alters firms’ incentives regarding
quality selection: selecting low quality in order to relax competition is not profitable in
the presence of sales restrictions. Therefore, it does not require quality monitoring, as
opposed to MQS.
In order to capture the intuition underlying our proposal, we develop a very simple
model. Suppose a government wishes to offer protection to an entrant facing competition
by an incumbent firm. Assuming that the incumbent is already committed to its quality
before the sales quota is enforced allows us to concentrate on the quality selection of the
entrant only. In order to analyze the role of the competition mode, we compare the optimal
quality selection of the entrant under Cournot and Bertrand competition at the market
stage, as a function of the “sales restriction” level. We show that for most values of this
quota, the optimal quality selection of the entrant is the same under Cournot and Bertrand
competition, and is greater than the optimal quality selected in the unconstrained game.
Most often, the optimal quality level is negatively related to the tightness of the sales
restriction. However, as compared to Cournot, the range where the quota is effective is
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larger under Bertrand competition.1
2. The Model
Consumers preferences are derived from the model of Mussa and Rosen (1978). Consumer
j exhibits a taste for quality θj and derives an indirect utility θjs− p when consuming a
product of quality s, bought at price p. Not consuming yields a utility of 0. Consumers’
types are uniformly distributed in the [0, 1] interval. The density is 1, and is taken as
a measure of the market size. In order to produce a quality level s, a firm has to incur
a sunk cost c(s) = s
2
8 (a more general analysis can be found in Boccard and Wauthy
(2002)). Marginal cost is assumed to be zero for simplicity. An incumbent originally sells
as a monopolist in the market a product of quality si = 1.2 We assume this producer to
be committed to this quality level.
The sequence of decisions is the following. The government chooses a sales restriction
(or a quota) from an interval [qmin, 1] with qmin > 0.3 Given the quota, the entrant firm
selects its quality se before both firms compete in the last stage of the game. We consider
in turn Cournot and Bertrand competition. Notice that given the specification of the
sunk cost, we may restrict the analysis of entrant’s quality selection to se ≤ 1, i.e. quality
leapfrogging by the entrant is not an issue in our setting.
3. Cournot Competition
We first solve the last stage of the game, and then we go backward to study quality
selection. The analysis of the unconstrained4 Cournot game is straightforward. Given
qualities and prices, demands are
xi = 1− pi − pe1− se (1)
xe =
pise − pe
se(1− se) (2)
1Notice that the impact of sales restrictions on quality selection has been studied recently in a specific
context. Herguera, Kujal and Petrakis (2000) study the impact of a trade quota imposed on a foreign firm
on equilibrium quality selection. However, their analysis is confined to Cournot competition. We compare
our results to theirs in the last section of the paper.
2Note that si = 1 is indeed the optimal choice of a monopolist under the cost assumption c(s) =
s2
8
.
The case for endogenous quality selection where the incumbent might not have the highest quality is the
object of a more involved paper Boccard and Wauthy (2001).
3The introduction of a lower bound for the quota is made to avoid technical problems in the derivation
of pricing games. The importance of this assumption is discussed below.
4in the rest of the paper, we will use the term ”unconstrained” to denote the case where no sales
restriction is imposed on the incumbent.
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thus the inverse demands characterizing Cournot competition are given by
pi = 1− xi − xese (3)
pe = (1− xi − xe)se (4)
The unconstrained Cournot equilibrium is directly obtained as
xce(se) ≡
1
4− se and x
c
i (se) ≡
2− se
4− se . (5)
Notice that xce is increasing with se while x
c
i is decreasing. The entrant’s profits at the
Cournot equilibrium are given by
pice(se) ≡
se
(4− se)2
− s
2
e
8
. (6)
The only relevant real root to the first order condition for maximization of pice is s
c
e '
0.363.5 This defines the optimal quality selection by the entrant when no sales restriction is
imposed. Demand addressed to the incumbent at the unconstrained SPE is Dci ≡ xci (sce) '
0.450.
We introduce now the sales restriction set at level q. In the analysis to follow we shall
distinguish between two notions of effectiveness for the sales restriction.
Definition 1 A sales restriction is ”short-run” effective if it alters the equilibrium out-
come at given qualities; it is ”long-run” effective if it alters the quality selection.
If the sales restriction is binding at the Cournot stage (after quality has been set), we
have xi = q. Using (4), the market clearing price for the entrant’s product is
pqe ≡ (1− q − xe)se (7)
It is then direct to show that at the “constrained” Cournot equilibrium sales of the entrant
are xcqe ≡ 1−q2 and xcqi = q. By maximizing
picqe (se) ≡
(1− q)2se
4
− s
2
e
8
, (8)
we obtain the optimal quality scqe ≡ (1 − q)2 for the entrant conditional on playing a
”constrained” Cournot equilibrium afterwards. Thus, the conditional optimal quality
selection is decreasing in the sales restriction: the tougher the protection granted to the
entrant, the greater the quality it can elicit.
Now, we address the following question: in which range is the sales restriction binding?
Once qualities have been selected, it is well known that in a Cournot game the sales
5To avoid cumbersome expressions, we retain here, as well as for the results to come, numerical approxi-
mations. The optimal value which solves 0 = 16−60y+48y2−12y3+y4 is y = 3−pz/2−q3− z/2 + 6/√2z
where z = 2 +
“
297−√22353
9
”
1/3 +
“
297+
√
22353
9
”
1/3.
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restriction is effective only if it is lesser than the demand addressed to the incumbent firm
(in equilibrium). However, since the sales restriction is committed to before the quality of
the entrant is selected, a sales restriction set above the unconstrained benchmark Dci may
be effective through its effect on quality selection. These two observations are gathered
into the following lemma:
Lemma 1 Sales restrictions above the unconstrained benchmark Dci ' 0.45 are never
short-run effective but can be long-run effective if chosen in the range [0.45; 0.461].
Proof Using (5), we compute the potential demand addressed to the incumbent firm
when the entrant chooses scqe as xci (s
cq
e ) =
2−(1−q)2
4−(1−q)2 . The incumbent firm is indeed con-
strained in the Cournot competition only if this demand exceeds the sales restriction. A
simple calculation show that this occurs for q < 0.461 only. A larger quota does not affect
the Cournot equilibrium and the quality selection of the entrant remains sce. 
As stated in the Lemma, long-run effectiveness can occur but this is up the entrant
to implement it. For the constrained equilibrium to take place, the entrant has to select
a quality level below the unconstrained one. Observe indeed that scqe decreases from
0.302 to 0.293 when the quota ranges in [0.45; 0.461] while sce = 0.363. This ability to
enforce a ”constrained” equilibrium does not mean that it is a wise strategy to follow
since quality downgrading lowers profits. In order to identify the range in which this
strategy is optimal for the entrant, we have to compare the equilibrium profits pice(s
c
e)
and picqe (s
cq
e ) =
(1+q)(1−q)3
8 . Solving for q, we obtain as the unique relevant real root q
c '
0.456 < 0.461 which therefore defines the critical value below which the sales restriction
is effective when committed to before entrant’s quality is selected. The next proposition
characterizes the impact of a sales restriction under Cournot competition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the Cournot competition depends on the sales restric-
tion level:
- If q > 0.456, the sales restriction is not effective, the unconstrained Equilibrium obtains.
- If q ≤ 0.456, the sales restriction is long-run effective, entrant’s quality is scqe = (1− q)2.
Corollary 1 When the sales restriction q passes below the limit qc where it starts to affect
the optimal quality choice, the entrant’s quality jumps down from 0.363 to 0.296 (cf. figure
1 p10).
4. Bertrand Competition
The analysis of Bertrand competition being slightly more complex, we divide it in 4 parts.
We first re-derive the unconstrained benchmark equilibrium, then tackle the implications
of a sales restriction in a pricing game before solving it. Lastly we turn to the choice of
the optimal quality by the entrant.
5
4.1. Free trade
Under Bertrand competition, demands (1) and (2) enable to compute firms’ best reply in
the unconstrained pricing game as
Φi(pe) =
1− se + pe
2
and Φe(pi) =
pise
2
. (9)
Straightforward computations yield the unique Nash equilibrium:
pbe =
se(1− se)
4− se and p
b
i =
2(1− se)
4− se . (10)
Using these values, we note that sales are xbe =
1
4−se and x
b
i =
2
4−se while the entrant’s
profit is
pibe(se) ≡
se(1− se)
(4− se)2 −
s2e
8
. (11)
The optimal quality selection of the entrant is computed as sbe ' 0.1923 and the associated
demand for the incumbent is Dbi ≡ xbi(sbe) = 0.525.
4.2. Effect of a sales restriction
Let us then consider the presence of a sales restriction. The analysis of quota constrained
pricing game with differentiated products has been developed first in Krishna (1989).6 As
shown by Krishna (1989), the first key difference between Cournot and Bertrand competi-
tion is that, under price competition, sales restrictions above the unconstrained equilibrium
demand of the incumbent are (almost) always ”short-run” effective. This is so because a
sales restriction deeply alters the structure of the pricing game. Therefore, we first have
to study in details the implication of the sales restriction on price competition itself before
we turn to the analysis of quality selection.
The key point is the following: Under price competition, consumers may be rationed
by the incumbent if its demand exceeds the sales restriction level. Rationed consumers
may then report their purchase on the entrant, whose effective sales increase. These
rationing spillovers destroy the global concavity of the entrant’s payoff and thereby make
the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium problematic. Thus, the presence of the sales
restriction induces Bertrand-Edgeworth competition at the market stage.
A peculiarity of the present model is that if the entrant sells the low quality, any con-
sumer that is rationed by the high quality incumbent prefers to report his purchase on the
entrant’s product rather than to refrain from buying. Accordingly, whenever xi(pe, pi) > q,
the number of consumers who report their purchase on firm e is given by xi(pe, pi)− q. It
is is then direct to show that the residual demand addressed to the entrant is
xqe(pe) = 1− q −
pe
se
. (12)
6We refer the interested reader to her paper for the full analysis os such cases. Regarding price equi-
librium, the present analysis is a direct application of the methodology proposed by Krishna (1989).
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Using (12) we may define pqe(pi) ≡ pi − (1− q)(1− se) such that xi(pe, pi) > q ⇔ pe >
pqe(pi). Whenever pe ≤ pqe(pi), the free trade analysis applies and firms’ demand are given
by (1) and (2). If on the other hand pe ≥ pqe, the potential demand of the incumbent
exceeds the legal limit q so that final sales are xqe(pe) and q respectively. Comparing
the derivatives of the entrant’s demand function using (1) and (12), we observe that the
entrant’s demand exhibits an outward kink at pe = p
q
e(pi). This kink destroys the concavity
of its profits. Thus, the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is not guaranteed.
4.3. Price equilibrium
We now characterize the nature of equilibrium in the pricing game. The incumbent’s
best reply is denoted ϕi. We define p
q
i (pe) ≡ (1 − q)(1 − se) + pe, the frontier of the
domain where the sales restriction is binding i.e., the solution of xi(pe, pi) = q. Over the
non-binding domain the best reply is Φi(pe) as defined by (9) if it belongs to this domain.
Over the binding domain, the incumbent is better off selling q at the highest possible price,
which is precisely the frontier price pqi (pe). The formal best reply is thus the minimum of
Φi(pe) and p
q
i (pe). Solving for equality we obtain p˜e = max {(1− se) (2q − 1) , 0} . Thus,
ϕi(pe) =
{
Φi(pe) iff pe < p˜e
pqi (pe) iff pe ≥ p˜e
(13)
Notice that the best reply is kinked and continuous, reflecting the fact that the incumbent’s
profit is concave in own price.
We turn to the entrant. The profit of the entrant when it benefits from spillovers is
pex
q
e(pe) (cf. (12)) and is maximum for pse =
1−q
2 se yielding profits equal to
(1−q)2
4 se. If
the sales restriction is not binding, the best reply is Φe(pi) as defined by (9), yielding a
payoff pie(pi) =
p2i se
4(1−se) . Solving for equality among those two profits in the variable pi, we
obtain the critical value p˜i ≡ (1 − q)
√
1− se for which the entrant is indifferent between
the two strategies. The best reply is therefore:
ϕe(pi) =
{
pse iff pi < p˜i
Φe(pi) iff pi ≥ p˜i
. (14)
Combining (13) and (14), we observe that there is only one candidate for a pure
strategy equilibrium: the unconstrained equilibrium as defined by (10).7 A necessary
and sufficient condition for this candidate to be an equilibrium is that pbi > p˜i. Direct
computations show that this condition is satisfied if and only if q > q¯(se) ≡ 1 − 2
√
1−se
4−se .
When this condition is not satisfied, there exist no pure strategy equilibrium.
7It is indeed immediate to check that p˜i < p
q
i (p
s
e), which is sufficient to rule out any pure strategy
equilibrium candidate in the sales restriction binding domain of prices. Therefore, the only remaining
candidates must lie in the unconstrained region. There is only one such candidate: the unconstrained
equilibrium.
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The natural candidate for a mixed strategy equilibrium is then the following one: The
entrant randomizes between pse and fe(p˜i) while choosing the weight to put on each pure
strategy to ensure that p˜i is indeed a best reply for the foreign firm against the mixture.
We call this equilibrium the Krishna equilibrium.8 The following lemma is the essence of
Krishna (1989)’s findings:
Lemma 2 As opposed to the Cournot case, a sales restriction above the unconstrained
equilibrium level can be short-run effective in the Bertrand game.
Proof Direct computations show that q¯(se) > xbi(se) =
2
4−se is always true. Accord-
ingly, whatever the entrant’s quality level se, any sales restriction q ∈
[
xbi(se); q¯(se)
]
is
such that the price equilibrium is a mixed strategy equilibrium involving prices greater
than those of the unconstrained equilibrium. In particular, at the unconstrained SPE we
have q¯(sbe) = 0.528 > x
b
i(s
b
e) = 0.525. 
4.4. Quality selection
Let us assume for the moment that the Krishna equilibrium always exists when the un-
constrained one does not and study the issue of quality selection. It is not necessary to
compute the mixed strategy explicitly for our present purpose. Indeed, the key point here
is to note that in this equilibrium, the entrant earns exactly pise =
(1−q)2
4 se in the Krishna
equilibrium.9 Notice that this is exactly equivalent to the Cournot equilibrium payoffs
under a binding sales restriction. Therefore, if the Krishna equilibrium is played at the
price competition stage, optimal quality selection by the entrant firm is identical to the
quality selection made under Cournot, i.e. sbqe = (1 − q)2, yielding a payoff (1−q)
4
8 when
we take the sunk cost into account.
In order to delineate the domain in which the sales restriction affects quality selection,
consider the optimal quality selection in the unconstrained equilibrium: sbe ' 0.192. As
noted above, we need q > qb(sbe) = 0.528 for the unconstrained equilibrium to exist in
the pricing game. On the other hand, it is always possible for the entrant to enforce
the Krishna equilibrium by choosing a high enough quality. In order to identify the
optimal strategy, we compare the corresponding payoffs. Direct computations indicate that
pibe(s
b
e) <
(1−q)4
8 whenever q < q
b ' 0.530, where qb defines the critical value above which
the sales restriction is neither long-run nor short-run effective under Bertrand competition.
Our findings are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the Bertrand competition depends on the sales restric-
tion level:
8We refer the interested reader to Krishna (1989), Theorem 2, for the detailed construction of this
equilibrium.
9In a mixed strategy, the equilibrium payoff can be computed at any of the firm’s atom. Since the
entrant faces a pure strategy, its equilibrium payoff, computed at pse must be
(1−q)2
4
se.
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- If q > 0.530, the sales restriction is not effective, the unconstrained Equilibrium obtains.
- If q ≤ 0.530, the sales restriction is long-run effective, entrant’s quality is sbqe = (1− q)2.
Corollary 2 At the limit qb ' 0.530 where the sales restriction starts to affect the optimal
quality choice, the entrant’s quality jumps up from 0.192 to (1− qb)2 = 0.221.
Let us then briefly comment on the existence of the Krishna equilibrium. Indeed, this
equilibrium does not always exist. For this equilibrium to exist, the incumbent’s demand
must satisfy the non-negativity constraint xi(Φe(p˜i), p˜i) > 0. Direct computations show
that this is the case if only q > 1− 2√1− se. In other words, there exists a lower bound
on the sales restriction value, which depends positively on se below which the Krishna
equilibrium does not exist. This condition imposes restrictions on the admissible values of
the sales restriction only if se > 3/4 holds. Notice then that (1−q)2 > 3/4 if only q < 0.134.
As a consequence, our analysis is fully compelling if we assume qmin ≥ 0.134. Hence our
initial assumption of a lower bound on the admissible values for the sales restriction.10
5. Comparing Cournot and Bertrand
As shown by Krishna (1989), the impact of a sales restriction at the market stage depends
on the mode of competition. This result is best observed in our framework by noting that
a sales restriction set slightly above the unconstrained SPE Dci ' 0.450 is never short-run
effective under Cournot while it is always short-run effective under Bertrand. However,
a sales restriction has also long-run implications. By comparing quality selection by the
entrant producer, we may now assess the long-run effectiveness of sales restrictions with
the help of Figure 1 below.
Firstly qb ' 0.530 > qc ' 0.456 implies that the range for an effective sales restriction
is larger under Bertrand than under Cournot. Secondly, note that for a large domain of
sales restrictions the quality selection is invariant to the mode of competition. Within
this domain, a government may increase quality simply by making the sales restriction
tighter. Last, as compared to their respective unconstrained values, the optimal quality
cannot decrease because of the sales restriction under Bertrand competition while there
exists a domain of sales restriction values, above the Free Trade benchmark for which the
sales restriction induces quality downgrading under Cournot.
The intuition underlying our result is easy to summarize. The presence of the sales
restriction softens competition, especially from the point of view of a low quality firm.
10When the Krishna equilibrium does not exist, there exists fully mixed strategy equilibria involving a
finite number of atoms. We have not been able to fully characterize them. However, Levitan and Shubik
(1972) provide a characterization for the particular case where se = 1. For the relevant domain of sales
restriction values, the payoff of the entrant at se = 1 dominates the unconstrained benchmark. Hence, in
this domain, it must be the case that the equilibrium quality is larger than the unconstrained one.
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Figure 1: Comparing the two modes of competition
Under Cournot competition, this increases the marginal values of quality upgrading. Un-
der Bertrand competition, the effect is even more striking. Sales restrictions relax price
competition so drastically that they remove any strategic incentives to select a low quality
level. There is indeed no need to relax price competition further.
As mentioned in the introduction, Herguera et al. (2000) considered a problem similar
to ours, in the specific context of international trade. In our framework, their model
corresponds to the Cournot case. The quota is imposed on the foreign firm (the incumbent
in our case) and they conclude to the following: as compared to the free trade equilibrium,
the domestic firm (the entrant) is likely to select a higher quality in the presence of
a restrictive sales restriction (lesser than the foreign sales under free trade) (see their
Proposition 2.a). If the sales restriction is set just above the foreign sales under free trade
equilibrium it is still effective in the sense that it alters the quality choice of the domestic
firm. More precisely, the domestic firm selects a lower quality, as compared to free trade.
(see Herguera et al. (2000), Proposition 1). In this respect, our analysis shows that the
risk of a local quality downgrading is entirely specific to the Cournot framework.
Our results have been obtained in a highly stylized framework. In particular, assuming
that the incumbent does not alter its quality selection as a response to the sales restriction
considerably eases the analysis. However, it is our belief that these results capture some
basic implications of “sales restrictions” on quality selection in more general settings.
In Boccard and Wauthy (2000), we consider a trade game where the domestic and the
foreign firms are free to choose any quality level, and thus induce any quality ranking
between the domestic and the foreign product after the sales restriction is implemented.
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We reach qualitatively similar conclusions: incentives to quality selection under Bertrand
competition are in line with those prevailing under Cournot whenever the sales restriction
is effective. The degree of product differentiation decreases when the sales restriction
becomes tighter. When it becomes long-run effective, a sales restriction induces a marked
quality upgrading under Bertrand.
In substance, the present note aimed at providing a simplified example in which the
role of “sales restrictions” as a mean to regulate quality provision could be exposed. It is
our belief that this mechanism is worth being investigated further. Several generalizations
of our example have to considered. Shouldn’t the two firms be constrained? Would
a firm, or two, voluntarily choose to constraint its sales? A common feature of these
generalizations is that they require a more general analysis of sales-constrained pricing
games with differentiated products. The characterization of price equilibria in such settings
is on our research agenda.
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